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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that 
roadblock stops are per se unconstitutional under the Utah 
Constitution because they are not authorized by statute? 
2. Did the court of appeals properly apply this 
Court's decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), in 
holding that defendant's consent to search was not valid and that 
the evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to his consent was 
therefore not admissible? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on March 15, 
1991, and appears in State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, [808 
P.2d 141] (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (a copy of the opinion is 
contained in the addendum). 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is 
contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1988) (R. 7). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the contraband seized from his car by the police during a 
roadblock stop (R. 12, 22-56). An evidentiary hearing 
established that defendant was stopped, along with numerous other 
vehicles, at a roadblock set up by the Utah Highway Patrol for 
the purpose of "detect[ing] driver's license, automobile 
registration, and equipment violations, as well as liquor and 
drug violations." State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 
Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1991). After being stopped at the roadblock, 
defendant consented to a search of his vehicle, including the 
trunk, which revealed small amounts of marijuana and a kilogram 
2 
brick of cocaine. Ibid.1 The trial court denied the motion to 
suppress, ruling that "(1) the roadblock stop did not violate the 
Utah or federal constitutions; (2) [defendant] voluntarily 
consented to the search of the vehicle, including the trunk; and 
(3) [the officer conducting the search] had probable cause to 
continue searching the trunk after [defendant]'s withdrawal of 
consent." Ibid. 
Subsequently, defendant was convicted of the charged 
offense after a bench trial based on stipulated facts (R. 142-
45). He was sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a fine of $1,250 and an 
additional $312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund (Id..). The 
court then suspended the prison term and placed defendant on 
eighteen months' probation (Id.). 
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the stop of his vehicle at the police 
roadblock constituted an unreasonable seizure under the federal 
and state constitutions, and therefore the contraband seized from 
his vehicle pursuant to his consent should have been suppressed. 
The court of appeals held that the roadblock violated the fourth 
amendment under Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. 
Ct. 2481 (1990), and that it also violated article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution because the roadblock was not expressly 
1
 A complete and accurate statement of facts appears in the 
court of appeals' opinion. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. For 
purposes of this petition, only a cursory summary of the facts is 
necessary to the presentation of the issues for review. 
3 
authorized by statute. State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-
13. It further held that, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990), defendant's consent to the search of his vehicle was 
not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful roadblock stop to 
avoid the taint of that initial illegality, and therefore the 
consent was invalid. Ld. at 13-14. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE ROADBLOCK WAS PER SE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO EXPRESS STATUTORY 
AUTHORIZATION FOR ROADBLOCKS. 
The court of appeals held that suspicionless, 
investigatory roadblocks set up by the police are per se 
unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution because there is no express statutory authority for 
such roadblocks. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12-13.2 This 
novel and far reaching conclusion should be reviewed, as the 
court of appeals has decided an important question of law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(d). 
The court of appeals concluded that roadblocks like the 
one employed in this case cannot be constitutional unless the 
legislature has expressly authorized them. It reasoned that this 
2
 As already noted, the court of appeals also held that the 
roadblock violated the fourth amendment. But, it based that 
ruling on grounds other than the absence of express statutory 
authority for police roadblocks. The State does not seek review 
of the court of appeals' determination that the roadblock 
violated the federal constitution. 
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Court's emphasis on the warrant requirement under article I, 
section 14, coupled with the legislature's independent action in 
authorizing ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints, 
required that the legislature expressly authorize suspicionless, 
investigatory roadblocks before they could be constitutional. In 
so holding, the court made the rather remarkable observation that 
"in authorizing [ports of entry and fish and game checkpoints], 
our legislature has, presumably, weighed the need for such 
suspicionless inspections against their intrusion upon individual 
liberty, a process analogous to that performed by a magistrate in 
the issuance of a warrant." Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 
(emphasis added). The fundamental flaw in this statement is that 
when considering whether to issue a warrant, a magistrate is 
concerned only with whether there is probable cause; he or she 
does not engage in weighing the need for a warrant against the 
intrusion upon individual liberty. A warrant and the attendant 
intrusion upon an individual's liberty are constitutional if 
supported by probable cause; the magistrate's determination of 
whether a search is constitutionally justified does not go beyond 
the probable cause determination. The legislature, on the other 
hand, while obviously concerned with the constitutionality of its 
enactments, does not determine the constitutionality of a 
particular police practice. Although it may prohibit certain 
police practices that the courts consider constitutional, such a 
statutory prohibition does not render the police practice 
unconstitutional; rather, the practice is merely illegal — that 
is, prohibited by statute. Likewise, the legislature does not 
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render a police practice constitutional simply because it 
authorizes the practice by statute* Nor is there any logical 
basis for the propositon that legislative approval is a 
prerequisite to a judicial determination that a particular police 
practice is constitutional. In short, the court of appeals 
incorrectly concluded that the legislature performs a judicial 
function, akin to that of a magistratef in determining the 
constitutionality of a particular police practice. See Sims, 156 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (Orme, J., concurring specially). 
Although the court of appeals finds support for its 
novel view in Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 
(1987), and State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okl. Cr. 1984)3, the 
better reasoned position is that adopted by the Appellate Court 
of Illinois in a case upholding a vehicle safety equipment 
checkpoint: 
Criminal statutes do contain an implied 
right of police to enforce them. While there 
are state and federal constitutional 
limitations on the means of enforcement, 
these limits are constitutional and not 
inherent in every criminal statute. The 
State has passed laws requiring safety 
equipment. Absent evidence of some contrary 
intent, the police should be able to enforce 
those laws in a constitutional manner. 
. . . . 
3
 The court of appeals also cited State v. Henderson, 114 
Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), in support of its position. 
That case is distinguishable from Nelson and Smith, in that the 
Idaho Legislature had explicitly limited the use of roadblocks to 
situations where officers desired to Mapprehend[] persons 
reasonably believed by such officers to be wanted for a violation 
of the laws of this state, of any other state, or of the United 
States[.]" Ld. at 1061 (quoting Idaho Code § 19-621) (emphasis 
in original). 
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We are loath to say that the State has 
anything but a strong interest in seeing that 
all motor vehicles are safe, and given the 
absence of any intent to provide otherwise, 
the safety equipment statutes carry with them 
an implied right of the officers to inspect 
autos in any constitutional manner* 
People v, Estrada, 68 Ul.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128, 133-34, 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). See also Nelson, 304 Or. at 
128, 743 P.2d at 710 (Peterson, C.J., dissenting). 
There are numerous law enforcement practices involving 
suspicionless and warrantless searches or seizures which this 
Court has recognized as constitutionally permissible and 
otherwise proper even though there is no explicit statutory 
authority for the particular practice. See, e.g., State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989) (recognizing plain view 
doctrine which allows an officer to seize evidence without a 
warrant if the officer is lawfully present and has probable cause 
to believe the item is evidence of a crime); State v. Banks, 720 
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1986) (recognizing search incident to 
arrest exception to the fourth amendment's warrant and probable 
cause requirements); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) 
(holding that inventory searches are permitted under the fourth 
amendment and article I, secticn 14 of the Utah Constitution). 
The court of appeals' state constitutional analysis casts doubt 
on the propriety of the foregoing police practices. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' approach, the most 
appropriate initial inquiry with respect to any law enforcement 
practice is to ask whether it is constitutional, not whether it 
is explicitly authorized by statute. While the particular 
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practice must impliedly be within the statutory authority of a 
peace officer*, explicit authority should not be required. 
Because the court of appeals' state constitutional holding has 
broad implications for law enforcement, this Court should grant 
certiorari and review that holding. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED STATE V. ARROYO, 
796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN A MANNER THAT 
APPEARS TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH FLORIDA V. 
ROYER, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), WHICH ARROYO 
IDENTIFIED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION 
OF THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE TWO-PART 
TEST FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT 
TO SEARCH; THE ARROYO TEST SHOULD BE 
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT. 
After the court of appeals had determined that the 
roadblock was unconstitutional under the federal and state 
constitutions, it then addressed the question of whether the 
drugs seized from defendant's vehicle were nevertheless 
admissible because their seizure resulted from a search conducted 
pursuant to defendant's consent. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13-
14. 
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that 
defendant did not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to 
the search, but that he claimed that "there was insufficient 
attenuation between his detention and the consent . . . to purge 
A
 Although the court of appeals concluded that there is 
"nothing in the Utah code that specifically prohibits the 
roadblock that was conducted here," Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
10, it did not directly resolve the question of whether police 
officers have implied authority to conduct roadblocks. Such 
implied authority can be derived from the general statutes which 
pertain to the authority of law enforcement officers in this 
state. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1990), 17-22-2 
(Supp. 1990), 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989), 41-1-17 (1988). 
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the taint of the illegality of the detention." Id. at 13. It 
noted that under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "to 
be constitutionally valid, a search consent following illegal 
police behavior must be both noncoerced and not arrived at by 
exploitation of the primary police illegality." Ibid. Applying 
the factors outlined in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
for evaluating the "non-exploitation or attenuation element," the 
court held that "the record demonstrates that [defendant]'s 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of 
the illegal roadblock." Id. at 14. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court relied most heavily on two factors: (1) 
"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and 
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial 
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent 
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) the 
record revealed no possibility of intervening circumstances 
between the illegal stop and [defendant]'s grant of consent to 
the search. Ibid. 
In Arroyo, this Court did not make clear how the 
exploitation analysis is to proceed, saying only that the primary 
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from 
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by 
that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown 
v. Illinois factors which should be considered, id. at 690-91 
n.4, but did not make clear whether the primary focus of the 
exploitation analysis is the possible effect of the initial 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent or rather 
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the police misconduct itself. Arroyo cites numerous cases on the 
issue of exploitation, .id. at 690-91, but does not express a 
preference for one of the two approaches those cases appear to 
adopt. 
For example, some of the cases clearly talk about the 
exploitation question in terms of the potential effect of the 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(M[W]e hold that the consent was the product of the illegal 
detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable stop was not 
sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were insufficient 
intervening circumstances that might have reduced the coercive 
nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to make a 
voluntary decision about the consent search.15); United States v. 
Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no intervening events 
or lapse of time which would show [the defendant's] consent was 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion'"); State v. Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 
(La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot 
say that [the defendant's] consent was sufficiently attenuated 
from the illegal arrest and search to be a product of her free 
will."). 
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the 
police misconduct. These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and how it may "taint" the consent such that 
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the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom, 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
This approach was followed by the court of appeals in the instant 
case. 
The former approach, which focuses primarily on the 
possible effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of 
the consent, appears to be most consistent with the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983), which this Court identified as an example of the 
application of the exploitation part of the two-part test adopted 
in Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 690. There, in concluding that the 
defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was tainted by 
the prior illegal police detention, a majority of the Supreme 
Court appears to have been most concerned with the coercive 
circumstances under which the consent to search had been obtained 
and the effect that those circumstances had on the voluntariness 
of the consent. Rover, 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring) 
("I agree with the plurality that . . . [the defendant's] 
surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot be viewed as 
consensual."). 
Because the court of appeals has construed the 
exploitation prong of Arroyo to focus primarily on the "temporal 
proximity" and "intervening circumstances" factors suggested in 
that case, and has implicitly rejected the alternative view that 
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the primary focus is the possible effect of the prior police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent — a view 
seemingly adopted in Rover, it has decided an important question 
of law which was not decided in Arroyo, but which should be 
decided by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). Accordingly, the 
Court should grant certiorari and review the court of appeals' 
decision. -_ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this M ^<jay of May, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
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